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 2 
Abstract 25 
Many animal species use a variety of cognitive strategies to locate food resources. One 26 
strategy is to make inferences by exclusion, i.e. perceiving the absence of reward as a cue that 27 
another location should be investigated. The use of such advanced cognitive strategies may be 28 
more prominent in species that are known to frequently solve social challenges, and 29 
inferential reasoning has mainly been investigated in social species such as corvids, dogs, 30 
dolphins and non-human primates. In this paper we investigate how far social intricacy may 31 
explain the disparity of reasoning performances observed in three cercopithecine species that 32 
differ in the density of their social network and the diversity of their social partners.  33 
We used standard reasoning tasks, testing the volume concept and inference by exclusion 34 
using visual and auditory modalities. We showed that Old World monkeys can infer the 35 
location of invisible food by exclusion. In addition, Tonkean macaques and olive baboons had 36 
greater performances in most tasks compared to rhesus macaques. These responses are 37 
consistent with the social complexity displayed by these three species. We suggest that the 38 
cognitive strategies required to navigate through a demanding social world are involved in the 39 
understanding of the physical domain.  40 
 41 
Keywords: Inference by exclusion, causal reasoning, social complexity, Macaca tonkeana, 42 
Papio hamadryas Anubis, M. mulatta. 43 
44 
 3 
Introduction 45 
Among the various strategies animals can use to locate food is their capacity to remember 46 
several food locations and sometimes use indirect information to infer the position of hidden 47 
food. These inferential abilities are most certainly vital for survival (Parker and Gibson 1977) 48 
and their comparison across several species has shed some light on our knowledge of the 49 
evolution of cognition (Tomasello & Call 1997). To date, two main hypotheses have been 50 
advanced to explain these abilities. First, animal cognition and its complexity may mirror the 51 
foraging needs of each species. In primates and in some species of other orders, the need to 52 
use tools to obtain food may well improve their general cognitive performances (Parker & 53 
Gibson 1977). Secondly, cognition may evolve to better solve social challenges, in 54 
accordance with the social intelligence hypothesis (Jolly, 1966; Humphrey, 1976 but see 55 
Kummer et al. 1990 and Menzel, 1997). Social challenges may vary in several ways. For 56 
example, species living in complex organizations and/or in fission-fusion societies face a 57 
greater need to remember absent group members, their links and their past interactions on a 58 
long-term basis (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990). Social complexity may also predict transitive 59 
reasoning in highly social ringtailed lemurs (Lemur catta) in comparison to the less social 60 
mongoose lemurs (Eulemur mongoz) (Maclean et al., 2008). The effect of sociality may also 61 
be seen in bird cognition. Social species such as pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) 62 
outperformed the more solitary western scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica), in a task testing 63 
transitive inference, a useful skill to efficiently assess dominance relationship between known 64 
and unknown individuals (Paz-y-Mino et al. 2004). Furthermore, the density of social 65 
networks and diversity of social partners may also have shaped the inferential reasoning 66 
performances of animals. In cercopithecines, which live in permanent multi-male-multi-67 
female groups (Smuts et al. 1987), group composition varies in the number of possible 68 
partners an individual can interact with; the higher the diversity of partners, the more 69 
cognitive flexibility should be required when processing the social environment. In the 70 
context of socioecological cognition (Cunningham & Janson, 2007) the cercopithecine sub-71 
family is a good model to investigate whether reasoning skills in the social domain can be 72 
detected within causal reasoning skills. Indeed, cercopithecines show flexibility in variation in 73 
relevant variables (e.g. group size, within-group agonism, social structure) (Dunbar, 1988; 74 
Hinde, 1983; Thierry et al, 2007) 75 
In standard inference by exclusion tasks, animals must infer from the absence of a cue that 76 
another location should be investigated. In the visual modality, great and lesser apes, baboons 77 
and capuchin monkeys can use the absence of a visible reward in one container as an 78 
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indication to choose an alternate container (Call, 2001, 2004; Sabbatini & Visalberghi, 2008; 79 
Paulkner et al. 2009; Schmidt & Fischer 2009; Hill et al. 2011). In the auditory modality, 80 
some apes can perceive the lack of noise as an indicator that a container is empty (Call, 2004), 81 
leading them to select the other container. Capuchins and baboons tested in a similar 82 
experimental setup generally fail (Paulkner et al. 2009; Sabbatini & Visalberghi 2008; 83 
Schmitt & Fischer 2009). The inferential abilities of great apes have been confirmed using 84 
other paradigms.  Call (2007) found that bonobos, gorillas and orangutans use the information 85 
provided by the inclination of a wooden board to infer the presence of food. Given the 86 
contrasted results between species, we think it is necessary to use a variety of tasks to 87 
establish a complete picture of inferential abilities (see also Amici et al. 2010). Relatively 88 
little work has been done on Old World monkeys in this respect, and our knowledge in this 89 
field is quite fragmented. 90 
In this paper, we studied rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), Tonkean macaques (M. 91 
tonkeana) and olive baboons (Papio h. anubis). Despite living in different types of habitat, 92 
these three species display a semi-terrestrial life and a similar feeding ecology. They all live 93 
in complex social networks of multi-male multi-female groups organized in several 94 
matrilines. Baboons and macaques are capable of dissimulation, triadic interactions, coalitions 95 
and complex social strategies (Chaffin et al. 1995; Ducoing & Thierry 2003; Noë 1994; Petit 96 
& Thierry 1994a; it et al. 1997; Smuts & Watanabe 1990; Strum 1982; Thierry et al. 2008). 97 
However, despite structural similarities in their social life, these three species display 98 
differences in terms of how many social partners an individual generally interacts with. 99 
Whilst interindividual interactions in rhesus macaques are mainly limited to kin and close-100 
ranking partners (Sueur et al. 2011), they extend beyond these limits in Olive baboons (Silk et 101 
al. 2010) and Tonkean macaques (Sueur et al. 2011). Rhesus macaques could be argued to 102 
have lower degrees of social complexity, at least with regard to this particular measure. The 103 
social environment therefore may be less demanding in the first species than in the two 104 
others. Indeed, elaborated social strategies are common in Tonkean macaques, exist in olive 105 
baboons and are scarce in rhesus macaques. This combination of sharing the same basic social 106 
system with different degrees in the depth of their social networks is therefore particularly 107 
useful when testing a hypothesis on the relation between social intricacy and inferential 108 
abilities. 109 
Here, we compared the responses of the three species in tasks that explored their capacity to 110 
reason about the physical properties of objects and their ability to display inferential 111 
reasoning by exclusion. Our procedure closely followed those used previously to test great 112 
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apes in these same tasks (Call 2004, 2006). Given the characteristics of their social world, we 113 
predict that Tonkean macaques should globally outperform baboons, themselves performing 114 
better than rhesus macaques in the physical domain. To facilitate the reading, we keep this 115 
order (Tonkean macaques, Olive baboons, rhesus macaques) in every part of the paper. 116 
 117 
Methods 118 
Subjects  119 
Eight Tonkean macaques, fourteen olive baboons and eight rhesus macaques living in social 120 
groups of various sizes took part in this study. There were 6 females and 24 males ranging 121 
from 3 to 28 years of age. When not specified, all individuals participated to the experiments. 122 
Subjects were all housed in similar conditions at several primate centres and zoological parks 123 
in Europe, with indoor and outdoor enclosures (ranging from 20 m
2
 to one ha) enriched with 124 
wooden sitting perches and/or natural vegetation. Subjects were individually tested in their 125 
outdoor cages (other group members were kept in another compartment during testing and 126 
could not approach). Monkey chow and water were available ad libitum, and fruit and 127 
vegetables were provided once a week after testing. Table 1 presents the name, species, age, 128 
sex, location and experimental participation of each subject. All individuals were naive 129 
regarding our experimental procedure at the beginning of the study.  130 
 131 
Data analysis 132 
We fitted generalized linear mixed models on the binary variable (1 for “correct choice” / 0 133 
for “incorrect choice”) with a Binomial family and a Logit link function (Brown and Prescott 134 
2006). Pseudoreplication due to repeated observations of the same individual across sessions 135 
was taken into consideration by adding the individual and the session as random effects. Best 136 
fitting models were selected on the basis of the lowest AIC, i.e. Akaike Information Criterion. 137 
Fisher tests were conducted on group responses. All statistical tests were two-tailed and α was 138 
set at 0.05. Average values are given as means ±SE (standard error). 139 
                             140 
                                                    ---------------------------------- 141 
Insert table 1 about here 142 
                                                    ---------------------------------- 143 
 144 
1. Experiment 1: Concept of Volume 145 
 146 
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The first experiment investigated whether monkeys inferred the presence of a food reward 147 
located under a board, based on this board’s inclined orientation (cf. call 2007).  148 
 149 
1.1. Method 150 
1.1.1. Subjects 151 
Seven Tonkean macaques, 14 olive baboons and seven rhesus macaques took part in this 152 
experiment (Table 1).  153 
1.1.2. Materials 154 
Two wooden boards (25 cm X 11 cm), two solid wooden wedges 3 cm high and a wooden 155 
platform were used. Subjects were rewarded with a 3 cm piece of banana. 156 
1.1.3. Procedure and design  157 
The experimenter placed the wooden platform in front of the subject. Subjects were 158 
accustomed to this procedure and quickly approached the apparatus. Then, the experimenter 159 
placed the two wooden boards about 30 cm apart behind an opaque screen and showed the 160 
reward to the subject. Hiding the manipulations from the subject, the experimenter then 161 
touched the two boards in succession to prevent the subject from using arm movements as a 162 
cue for the location of food, placing the reward either on or under one of the boards, 163 
according to the condition. After baiting, the experimenter removed the screen and pushed the 164 
platform against the mesh within reaching distance of the subject. The subject could then 165 
respond by lifting one of the two boards. The first board touched by the subject was scored as 166 
its choice. There were three experimental conditions:  167 
Baseline:  The reward was placed on top of one of the boards, so that both boards remained 168 
flat on the platform.  169 
Inclined:  The reward was hidden under one of the boards providing an inclined orientation to 170 
the board of approximately 30°. The other board remained flat on the platform.  171 
Control:  The reward was placed under one of the boards, and a 3 cm high wooden wedge was 172 
also placed underneath each board so that both boards acquired an inclined orientation. 173 
 174 
Each subject took part in six 12-trial sessions (four trials per condition per session) for a total 175 
of 24 trials per condition. All conditions were randomly presented during a session with the 176 
restriction that they should be uniformly distributed across a session. The position of the 177 
reward (left vs. right) was semi-randomly assigned, as the reward was placed the same 178 
number of times on each side, and no more than twice in a row on the same side.  179 
 180 
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1.2. Results 181 
Figure 1 presents the percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species.  182 
The interaction between condition and species affected the overall rate of correct trials (N = 183 
28; best fitting model: AIC=1918). All species performed better in the baseline condition than 184 
in the inclined condition (Multiple Tukey-Kraemer comparisons, z=11.89, P=0.0001) and in 185 
the control one (Multiple Tukey-Kraemer comparisons, z=13.98, P=0.0001) and better in the 186 
inclined condition than in the control one (Multiple Tukey-Kraemer comparisons, z=4.83, 187 
P=0.001). Whatever the condition, multiple Tukey-Kraemer comparisons revealed that 188 
Tonkean macaques performed significantly better than both baboons (z=5.17, P=0.0001) and 189 
rhesus macaques (z=4.22, P=0.0001) whereas the two latter did not differ (z=0.39, P=0.92). 190 
                                                       ------------------------------- 191 
Insert figure 1 about here 192 
------------------------------- 193 
  194 
To investigate in details the interaction condition x species, we ran fisher tests. All species 195 
selected the correct alternative above chance level in the baseline condition (t>42.0, p<0.001, 196 
Fisher tests) and none did so in the control condition (t<0.71 in all cases, P>0.50).  Tonkean 197 
macaques performed clearly above chance in the inclined condition (only 13.1% of incorrect 198 
choices, t6=9.72, p<0.001). Baboons also performed above chance in the inclined condition 199 
but less so than Tonkean macaques (notwithstanding 43.32% of incorrect choices, t13=3.91, 200 
p=0.002). Rhesus macaques did not select the correct alternative in the inclined condition 201 
(t6=1.64, p=0.15).  202 
 
203 
1.3. Discussion 204 
Tonkean macaques located the food according to the orientation of the board in the inclined 205 
condition and thus outperformed the two other species. Rhesus macaques showed no 206 
understanding that the inclination of the board could be used as a cue to locate food.  In all 207 
other experimental conditions, the three species did not differ from each other and produced 208 
the expected response, choosing the board with a visible reward in the baseline condition and 209 
making a random choice in the control one. 210 
 211 
2. Experiments 2 to 4: Use of visual and auditory cues to locate food 212 
In these experiments, we assessed whether monkeys inferred the location of a reward with the 213 
specific use of the presence (or absence) of visual or auditory cues (cf. Call 2004). In a first 214 
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step (experiment 2), we assessed whether monkeys are capable of using full visual and/or 215 
auditory information to find a piece of food hidden in one of two boxes. In order to further 216 
investigate their inferential abilities, we run experiments 3 & 4. In experiment 3, we 217 
investigated whether monkeys could infer from partial visual information (i.e. no visible food 218 
in box A) that the alternative location (i.e. box B) should be chosen. In experiment 4, we 219 
assessed whether monkeys could infer from partial auditory information (i.e. no sound 220 
coming from the shaken box A), that only the alternative box (i.e. box B) may contain a 221 
reward. 222 
 223 
2.1. Experiment 2: Full information  224 
In this experiment, subjects were given full visual or auditory information to choose between 225 
two locations and select the box containing a reward. 226 
2.1.1. Method 227 
2.1.1.1. Subjects 228 
Eight Tonkean macaques, eight rhesus macaques and fourteen olive baboons took part in this 229 
experiment (Table 1).  230 
2.1.1.2. Materials 231 
Two opaque boxes with their respective lids were placed on a platform about 30 cm apart. 232 
The rewards were a piece of banana, three Mini-Smarties
®
 or a piece of banana with a Mini-233 
Smartie
®,
 depending on the condition (see below). 234 
2.1.1.3. Procedure and design 235 
The experimenter sat facing the subject behind the platform. All the subjects were habituated 236 
to this procedure and quickly approached the experimenter and sat facing the experimenter as 237 
soon as she sat behind the platform. The experimenter placed the open boxes on the platform 238 
behind an opaque screen, then showed the reward to the subject, before inserting her hand 239 
successively into both boxes, leaving the reward in one of the boxes. In half of the trials the 240 
experimenter left the reward in the left-hand box, whereas in the other half the experimenter 241 
left the reward in the right-hand box. The experimenter placed the lids on the boxes, removed 242 
the screen and gave the cue depending on the modality condition. The two sensory modalities 243 
were assessed in the three following conditions:  244 
Visual:  The experimenter removed the top of both boxes in succession (left then right), 245 
showing its contents to the subject by tilting each open box toward the subject, making sure 246 
that the subject had seen the location of the reward, before replacing the top on the box. 247 
Auditory:  The experimenter lifted the left-hand box and shook it, without opening it, using a 248 
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sideways motion for approximately 2-3 s and replaced the box on the table. Next, the 249 
experimenter repeated the same manipulation with the right-hand box. Shaking the baited box 250 
produced an audible rattling noise, whereas shaking the empty box did not.  251 
Control:  The experimenter lifted both boxes in succession (left then right) without opening or 252 
shaking them. This last condition assessed the possibility that subjects used inadvertent cues 253 
given by the experimenter, the food itself, or the baiting procedure to find the food, or 254 
presented a side preference bias. 255 
  256 
After administering each cue, the experimenter pushed the boxes against the fence so that the 257 
subjects could choose one of them. The first box touched by the subject was scored as its 258 
choice. As previously, each subject took part in six 12-trial sessions (four trials per condition 259 
per session) for a total of 24 trials per condition. All conditions were presented in random 260 
order during a session with the restriction that they should be uniformly distributed across a 261 
session. The position of the reward (left vs. right) was randomly determined with the 262 
restriction that it could not appear more than twice in a row on the same side.  The rewards 263 
were a piece of banana in the visual condition, three Mini-Smarties
®
 in the auditory condition 264 
and a piece of banana with a Mini-Smartie
®
 on it in the control condition. 265 
 266 
2.1.2. Results 267 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species.  268 
The interaction between condition and species affected the overall rate of correct trials (N = 269 
30; best fitting model: AIC=2248). All species performed differently in each condition. They 270 
were better in the visual condition than in the auditory condition (Multiple Tukey-Kraemer 271 
comparisons, z=11.14, P=0.001) and better in the auditory condition than in the control one 272 
((Multiple Tukey-Kraemer comparisons, z=6.54, P=0.0001). Whatever the condition, multiple 273 
Tukey-Kraemer comparisons revealed that both Tonkean macaques (z=4.23, P=0.001) and 274 
baboons (z=3.44, P=0.002) performed significantly better than rhesus macaques.  275 
------------------------------- 276 
Insert figure 2 about here 277 
------------------------------- 278 
To investigate in details the interaction condition x species, we ran fisher tests. All species 279 
performed above chance level in the visual condition (Tonkean macaques: t7=22.68, p<0.001; 280 
baboons: t13=21.84, p<0.001; rhesus:  t7=11.09, p<0.001), but at chance levels in the control 281 
condition (Tonkean macaques: t7=0.55, p=0.60; baboons: t13=0.38, p=0.71; rhesus macaques: 282 
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t7=1.00, p=0.35). Additionally, Tonkean macaques and baboons but not rhesus macaques 283 
performed above chance in the auditory condition (Tonkean macaques: t7=5.45, p=0.001; 284 
baboons: t13=5.66, p<0.001; rhesus macaques: t7=0.63, p=0.55). 285 
 286 
2.1.3 Discussion 287 
All species successfully relied on the visual information to locate the food. Visual cues were 288 
more informative than auditory ones for all species. Still, most Tonkean macaques and 289 
baboons successfully used the auditory information to locate the food. Note that in the case of 290 
the rhesus macaques, we observed a retreat reaction when hearing the baited box being 291 
shaken. This could explain their lack of understanding. 292 
 293 
2.2. Experiment 3: Partial Visual Information 294 
The procedure was the same as in the visual condition of experiment 2 (full information), 295 
with the difference that a cue was given for only one of the boxes (either the baited or the 296 
empty one), therefore providing only partial information about the location of the reward. 297 
 298 
2.2.1. Method 299 
2.2.1.1. Subjects 300 
All subjects that were above chance in the visual condition of experiment 2 took part in this 301 
experiment, except for one female Tonkean macaque that was not available during this testing 302 
period. Seven Tonkean macaques, fourteen olive baboons and eight rhesus macaques took 303 
part in this experiment (see Table 1). 304 
 305 
2.2.1.2. Materials 306 
The materials were the same as in Experiment 2. A banana piece was used as reward. 307 
 308 
2.2.1.3. Procedure and design 309 
The general procedure was the same as the one used in the visual condition of experiment 2. 310 
The experimenter baited one of the boxes and offered some information about the contents of 311 
the boxes, and subjects indicated their choice by touching one of the boxes. In the current 312 
experiment, the experimenter not only offered visual information or no information at all 313 
regarding the location of the reward, but also manipulated the amount of information provided 314 
to the subject. There were three conditions: 315 
Partial Visual Baited:  The experimenter showed the content of the baited box by tilting it 316 
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forward so that the subject had seen the location of the reward and lifted the empty box.  317 
Partial Visual Empty:  The experimenter showed the contents of the empty box by tilting it 318 
and lifted the baited box. In this case, the subject had not seen the location of the reward but 319 
could infer it.  320 
Control:  The experimenter lifted both boxes in succession without opening any of them. The 321 
subject had no information to find the reward.  322 
 323 
In each trial, the experimenter always gave the cue about the left-hand box first, then about 324 
the right-hand one regardless of which one was baited. The baited box was then touched first 325 
in half of the trials only, so that subjects could not use the order of contact of the boxes as 326 
relevant information. As previously, each subject took part in six 12-trial sessions (four trials 327 
per condition per session) for a total of 24 trials per condition. All conditions were presented 328 
in random order during a session with the restriction that they should be uniformly distributed 329 
across a session. The position of the reward (left vs. right) was randomly determined with the 330 
restriction that it could not appear more than twice in a row on the same side. 331 
 332 
2.2.2. Results 333 
Figure 3 presents the percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species.  334 
The condition and species affected the overall rate of correct trials (N = 29; best fitting model: 335 
AIC=2014). All species performed similarly in both baited and empty conditions (Multiple 336 
Tukey-Kraemer comparisons, z=1.39, P=0.344) and were better in these two conditions than 337 
in the control one (Multiple Tukey-Kraemer comparisons baited vs. control: z=11.47, 338 
P=0.001 & empty vs. control: z=12.55, P=0.0001). Paired comparison tests show no further 339 
indication of species differences.   340 
------------------------------- 341 
Insert figure 3 about here 342 
------------------------------- 343 
  344 
Investigating in more details, all species performed above chance in the baited (Tonkean 345 
macaques:  t5=42.60, p<0.001; baboons: t13=4.04, p=0.001; rhesus macaques:  t5=6.14, 346 
p=0.002) and empty conditions (Tonkean macaques: t5=3.56, p=0.016; baboons: t13=9.21, 347 
p<0.001; rhesus macaques:  t5=2.83, p=0.037) but not in the control condition (Tonkean 348 
macaques:  t5=1.75, p=0.14; baboons: t13=-2.88, p=0.13; rhesus macaques:  t5=0.67, p=0.53). 349 
 350 
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 351 
2.2.3. Discussion 352 
All species successfully relied on partial visual information to find the location of the food. 353 
This included inferring the correct location when no reward was visible in the demonstrated 354 
container.  Baboons were particularly good at it. 355 
 356 
2.3. Experiment 4: Partial Auditory Information 357 
 358 
This experiment was conducted in a similar manner as the auditory condition of experiment 2 359 
(full information), with the difference that information was given about one box only (either 360 
the baited or the empty one) therefore providing only a partial auditory cue. 361 
 362 
2.3.1. Method 363 
2.3.1.1. Subjects 364 
Since rhesus macaques failed to fully understand the auditory condition in experiment 2, they 365 
were not tested in this experiment. For Tonkean macaques and olive baboons, all subjects 366 
who were above chance in the auditory condition of experiment 2 took part in this 367 
experiment, except for one female macaque that was not available during this testing period. 368 
Seven Tonkean macaques and seven olive baboons participated in this experiment (Table 1). 369 
 370 
2.3.1.2. Materials 371 
The materials were the same as in experiment 2. 372 
 373 
2.3.1.3. Procedure and design 374 
The general procedure was the same as that of the auditory condition of experiment 2. The 375 
experimenter baited one of the boxes and offered some information about the contents of the 376 
boxes, and subjects indicated their choice by touching one of the boxes. In the current 377 
experiment, the experimenter not only offered auditory information or no information at all 378 
regarding the location of the reward, but also manipulated the amount of information provided 379 
to the subject. There were three conditions: 380 
Partial Auditory Baited:  The experimenter shook the baited box and lifted the empty one 381 
without shaking it, so that at the end of these manipulations the subject had heard the noise 382 
created by the reward. 383 
Partial Auditory Empty:  The experimenter shook the empty box and lifted the baited one 384 
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without shaking it, so that the subject did not hear the noise of a reward in the baited box, and 385 
could hence infer its position in the other box.  386 
Control:  The experimenter lifted both boxes in succession without shaking them, giving no 387 
auditory cues to the subject.  388 
 389 
 In each trial, the experimenter always gave the cue by manipulating the left-hand box first 390 
and then the right-hand one, regardless of which one was baited. The reward was three Mini-391 
Smarties
®
 in all conditions.  As in previous experiments, each subject received six 12-trial 392 
sessions (four trials per condition per session) for a total of 24 trials per condition. All 393 
conditions were presented in random order during a session with the restriction that they 394 
should be uniformly distributed across a session. The position of the reward (left vs. right) 395 
was randomly determined with the restriction that it could not appear more than twice in a 396 
row on the same side. 397 
 398 
2.3.2. Results 399 
Figure 4 presents the percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species. 400 
The interaction between condition and species affected the overall rate of correct trials (N = 401 
14; best fitting model: AIC=1224). Both species performed differently in each condition. 402 
They were better in the baited condition than in empty and control conditions (Multiple 403 
Tukey-Kraemer comparisons, baited vs. empty: z=8.3, P=0.001 & baited vs. control: z=7.68, 404 
P=0.001). Whatever the condition, multiple Tukey-Kraemer comparisons revealed that 405 
Tonkean macaques performed significantly better than baboons (z=3.4, P=0.001).  406 
 407 
                                                      ------------------------------- 408 
Insert figure 4 about here 409 
------------------------------- 410 
   411 
To investigate in details the interaction condition x species, we ran fisher tests. Tonkean 412 
macaques performed above chance in the baited condition (t6=25.20, P<0.001) but not in the 413 
empty (t6=0.66, P=0.53) or control conditions (t6=0.93, P=0.39). Baboons performed above 414 
chance in the baited condition (t6=2.83, P=0.03) but not in the empty (t6=0.41, P=0.70) or 415 
control conditions (t6=2.43, P=0.051) 416 
 417 
2.3.3. Discussion 418 
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Tonkean macaques and olive baboons successfully located the food when shaking the box 419 
produced a sound. Neither species successfully inferred the location of the food when they 420 
had to rely on a shaken box that made no noise. 421 
 422 
General discussion   423 
To sum the results, we found that inferring the location of hidden food from the inclination of 424 
a board appeared to be systematic in Tonkean macaques, common in olive baboons and 425 
incomplete in rhesus macaques, as shown in the first experiment. Subsequent experiments 426 
showed that although all species displayed good inference skills in the visual modality, none 427 
of them understood that the absence of noise meant an absence of food. Moreover, rhesus 428 
macaques were unable to use auditory information even when both boxes were shaken, whilst 429 
the two other species succeeded in doing so.  430 
Experimental factors and/or temperament may explain the differences found between species 431 
in our study. For example in experiment 2, rhesus macaques appeared more unsettled by the 432 
noise than the two other species. The set up (proximity with experimenter, isolation from the 433 
group, distractive stimuli in the room) may not be responsible for species differences since in 434 
some conditions (like the baited conditions), all specie performed similarly. However, we 435 
cannot discard an influence (even partial) of temperament on performances.  Indeed, recent 436 
studies in macaques suggest that different social styles can lead to structural differences in 437 
personality dimensions (such as anxiety, confidence, reactivity levels) (Capitanio 1999; 438 
Konečná et al. 2012; Neumann 2013; Weiss et al. 2011).  439 
When considering the results all together, Tonkean macaques did well in most tasks. This is 440 
in accordance with their performances during previous food location experiments. They are 441 
known to spontaneously use a branch to reach unattainable food (Ducoing & Thierry 2005), 442 
to use mirrors to guide their search for hidden food (Anderson 1986) and visual traces of food 443 
on a congener’s face to locate a distant food item (Drapier et al. 2002). Similarly to Schmitt 444 
and Fischer’s findings (2009), olive baboons performed better when shown the empty box 445 
(partial visual empty condition) than when the food was visible (partial visual baited 446 
condition) which is counter-intuitive. We suppose that partial information led them to adopt a 447 
fixed and conservative strategy: avoiding touching the container that they saw was empty. In 448 
the auditory condition with full information, baboons performed well, a result that was not 449 
observed by Schmitt & Fischer (2009) despite the fact that their baboons received more than 450 
200 trials in the auditory modality. Concerning rhesus macaques, our findings fit with the 451 
results of de Blois and Novak (1994), who found that their subjects failed in another inference 452 
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task. 453 
Concerning the different performances between modalities, understanding that food occupies 454 
space and/or may still exist despite being invisible is essential for efficient foraging, and thus 455 
survival. Not understanding or reasoning about auditory cues may be less crucial. Primates 456 
have been reported to match vocalizations with the corresponding emitter and to recognize the 457 
status of an animal through its calls (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990, 1999; Gouzoules et al. 1984). 458 
However, this ability may not strictly apply to non-social problem solving.  459 
We may hypothesize that interspecific differences in performances could be a consequence of 460 
broadly different ecological pressures. Contrary to the other species, rhesus macaques face a 461 
great diversity of habitats (Fooden 1982) and we could expect this species to outperform 462 
others in reasoning skills, which was not observed. Given their omnivorous diets, the three 463 
species still have to adjust their foraging strategies to seasonal changes in food distribution 464 
(availability and location) and may face similar ecological constraints. Thus, we may turn to 465 
other explanations to account for these interspecific differences in the physical domain.  466 
When relating to the social world of each species, the observed responses are generally 467 
consistent with the social complexity displayed by each species. However, contrary to our 468 
assumption that Tonkean macaques should globally outperform baboons and rhesus 469 
macaques, Tonkean macaques did not strictly outperform Olive baboons while both species 470 
displayed better performances than rhesus macaques in most tasks. As their high level of 471 
tolerance facilitates interactions with all group members, Tonkean macaques can develop 472 
positive relationships with many partners, regardless of their kinship and rank. For example, 473 
individuals nearly always reconcile after a fight to restore their relationships, and uninvolved 474 
third-party individuals favour peaceful interventions in fights between others and hence avoid 475 
jeopardizing their relationships with both opponents (Petit & Thierry 1994a; Demaria & 476 
Thierry 2001). This may require weighing up the implications of each intervention and 477 
reasoning about its consequences in terms of maintaining a complex network of allies. 478 
Savannah baboons live in large troops with more than hundreds of individuals (Smuts et al. 479 
1987) and display strategic coalitions (Noë 1994) even if they show lower tendencies to 480 
reconcile than Tonkean macaques (Aureli et al. 2002; Petit & Thierry 1994b). Peaceful 481 
interventions also exist but are scarcer than in Sulawesi macaques (Petit et al. 1997). By 482 
comparison, the network of rhesus macaques is limited to the matriline and close-ranking 483 
congeners (Sueur et al. 2011). Reconciliation is rare and third-party interventions during 484 
conflicts take the form of aggressive coalitions (Demaria & Thierry 2001). Rhesus poorer 485 
reasoning performances are probably not linked to their learning or discrimination abilities 486 
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that are known to be generally good (Harlow & Mears 1979; Rumbaugh et al. 1996). Further 487 
testing in this species is needed to confirm their lack of success in causal reasoning tasks, 488 
testing that may require increasing sample size. 489 
Assuming that we can estimate social complexity from the above facts, we can hypothesize 490 
that it may have helped both Tonkean macaques and baboons to solve cognitive tasks better 491 
than rhesus macaques.  492 
The potential impact of sociality on the evolution of cognition has also been documented in 493 
other cognitive abilities. Amici and colleagues (2008) found that inhibitory skills were 494 
correlated with the degree of fission fusion in nonhuman primates.  In particular, species with 495 
higher levels of fission-fusion also showed better inhibitory skills regardless of the 496 
phylogenetic relationship between species. Thus, gorillas clustered with long-tailed macaques 497 
and capuchins, whereas spider monkeys clustered with chimpanzees, orangutans and bonobos 498 
(Amici et al. 2008). However such assumption needs further demonstration of the proximate 499 
mechanisms at stake. 500 
Even if Reader and Laland (2002) argue that ‘physical’ intelligence and social intelligence co-501 
vary since social and ecological factors are inseparable in the daily lives of social species (cf. 502 
Cunningham & Janson, 2007), the challenges of social life may be more demanding than 503 
those posed by the physical world (Humphrey, 1976; Tomasello & Call 1997 but see also 504 
Menzel, 1997). To complete our investigation and definitely determine how social demands 505 
may have shaped the evolution of cognition, it would be necessary to run similar comparisons 506 
between solitary and social species, as already done in birds (Paz-y-Miño et al. 2004).  507 
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Tables 642 
Table 1  643 
Name, species, age, sex, location and the experiments in which each subject participated 644 
Name Species Age (years) Sex Location Experiments 
Janek M. tonkeana 11 M Strasbourg 1 - 4 
Milos M. tonkeana 11 M Strasbourg 1 - 4 
Gaetan M. tonkeana 10 M Strasbourg 1 - 4 
Paola M. tonkeana 3 F Strasbourg 1, 2 
Tina M. tonkeana 28 F Mulhouse 2 - 4 
Natchez M. tonkeana 6 M Rieti 1 - 4 
Nabou M. tonkeana 6 M Rieti 1 - 4 
Nina M. tonkeana 7 F Rieti 1 - 4 
Klaas M. mulatta 6 M Rijswijk 1 – 3 
Threelegs M. mulatta 18 M Rijswijk 1 – 3 
Cocos M. mulatta 4 M Rijswijk 1 – 3 
Ogun M. mulatta 4 M Rijswijk 1 – 3 
Chat M. mulatta 4 M Rijswijk 1 – 3 
River M. mulatta 6 F Rijswijk 2, 3 
Mees M. mulatta 8 F Rijswijk 1 – 3 
Castore M. mulatta 6 M Rieti 1 – 3 
Prise P. anubis 7 F Rousset/Arc 1 – 4 
Marius P. anubis 9 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 3 
Raimu P. anubis 6 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 3 
Momo P. anubis 8 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 4 
Olav P. anubis 8 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 3 
Rodolphe P. anubis 6 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 3 
Balthazar P. anubis 15 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 3 
Riri P. anubis 6 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 3 
Paul P. anubis 7 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 4 
Otto P. anubis 8 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 3 
Rambo P. anubis 5 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 4 
Alex P. anubis 11 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 4 
Kiki P. anubis 11 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 4 
Kiwi P. anubis 10 M Rousset/Arc 1 – 4 
Locations: Centre de Primatologie, Strasbourg, France; Parc Zoologique, Mulhouse, France; Giardino Faunistico 645 
di Piano dell’Abatino, Rieti, Italy; Biomedical Primate Research Centre, Rijswijk, Netherlands; Station de 646 
Primatologie, Rousset-sur-Arc, France. 647 
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Figures captions 648 
Fig.1  Mean percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species in experiment 1 649 
Fig.2  Mean percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species in experiment 2 650 
Fig.3  Mean percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species in experiment 3 651 
Fig.4  Mean percentage of correct trials across conditions for each species in experiment 4 652 
 653 
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